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INTRODUCTION
When a victim of a Title VII violation files a charge of discrimi-
nation six months and one day from the date on which the discrimina-
tory practice occurred, an otherwise illegal discriminatory act becomes
“merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal
consequences.”1 The short deadlines for filing a claim serve the im-
portant purpose of avoiding the litigation of stale claims, where “the
search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence,
whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories,
disappearance of documents, or otherwise.” 2 Indeed, “the right to be
free of stale claims” is so important that “in time [it] comes to prevail
over the right to prosecute them.” 3 In its zeal to protect this very
* J.D., Duke University, B.A., Duke University, Associate Professor of Law,
Charleston School of Law. The author wishes to thank Brian Macho for his research
assistance.
1. Harris v. City of Fresno, No. 1:07-CV-01210-OWW-SMS, 2009 WL 1460822, at
*10 (E.D. Cal. May 26, 2009) (quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558
(1977)). Title VII requires that discrimination claims be filed with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 days of the date on which the
alleged discriminatory practice occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006). If the claimant
first institutes proceedings with a state agency that enforces its own discrimination laws,
however, then the period for filing claims with the EEOC is extended to 300 days. Id. See
also Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Charging
parties have the benefit of the 300-day time limit for filing their federal claims even
when they have missed the state’s filing deadline for submitting those claims to the state
deferral agency.”).
2. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
3. Id. (quoting R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944));
see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 630 (2007) (noting that
1
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important interest, the United States Supreme Court made it vir-
tually impossible for certain victims of pay discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act4 to bring their claims.5 In
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Supreme Court dis-
missed a lawsuit for pay discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act on statute of limitations grounds, holding that discrimina-
tory pay decisions trigger the running of a limitations period, whether
or not an affected employee knew or should have known that the pay
decision in question was discriminatory or whether it would lead to
a pay differential.6 The Ledbetter case involved a claim of discrimi-
nation in pay based on sex, but its holding had broader implications
under the statute and would have applied to all claims based on a
protected characteristic, including race, color, national origin, and
religion.7 There was an immediate outcry over its implications and
its reach to other discrimination laws.8
the EEOC filing deadline “protect[s] employers from the burden of defending claims arising
from employment decisions that are long past” (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449
U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980))), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
5. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 632 (holding that a lawful employment practice that
occurred within the limitations period and which gives effect to “an intentional dis-
criminatory act that occurred outside the charging period” is not enough to give rise to
liability); cf. id. at 645-46, 649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the “realit[y]
of the workplace” would make it difficult for a person to identify discriminatory pay
practices within the statue of limitations period).
6. Id. at 628, 632 (majority opinion).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (stating that it is illegal to fire or refuse to hire
someone, or to discriminate against them regarding employment pay, conditions, terms
or privileges because of race, national origin, gender, color, or religion).
8. The laws that would have been affected include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon age); the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006) (prohibiting discrimi-
nation based on disability); and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794
(2006) (prohibiting discrimination based on disability by federal government agencies).
See Justice Denied? The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Employment Discrimination Decision: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Education
and Labor, 110th Cong. 14 (2007) (statement of Wade Henderson, President and CEO,
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights) (“The impact of the court’s decision in Ledbetter
will be widespread, affecting pay discrimination cases until [sic] Title VII involving women
and racial and ethnic minorities, as well as cases under the Age Discrimination and
Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act.”). The decision was rendered
on May 29, 2007, and editorials were published two days later. See, e.g., Editorial, Injustice
5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A18 (pointing out that it would be difficult after
the Ledbetter ruling for pay discrimination victims to sue under Title VII); Editorial, Life
vs. the Law, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A26 (discussing the difficulty of discovering
most instances of pay disparity within the required 180-day time limit); Editorial, Sterile
Thinking on Pay Equity, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 2007, at 18 (quoting Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent, where she stated that race-based pay discrimination claims would also be affected
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In response to the outcry over the decision, Congress enacted
legislation to overrule the case, and on January 29, 2009, just nine
days after he was sworn into office, President Obama signed the legis-
lation, his first bill, into law.9 The new law, named the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act (the “Ledbetter Fair Pay Act” or the “Ledbetter Act”)
after the female employee who was the victim of pay discrimination
with no hope for redress, extended the time allowed for an employee
to bring a claim by allowing each new paycheck to trigger the run-
ning of the limitations period under Title VII.10 It does not, however,
address the real problem facing employees, which is the difficulty of
discovering that pay discrimination exists in the first place.11 As
Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent in Ledbetter, “[c]ompensation
disparities . . . are often hidden from sight. It is not unusual . . . for
management to decline to publish employee pay levels, or for em-
ployees to keep private their own salaries.”12 Given these “realities of
by the Ledbetter decision); see also Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment
Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 353
n.4, 354 (2008) (citing editorials and other commentaries warning of the decision’s import
and suggesting that “Ledbetter is part of a much deeper and more potentially devastating
conceptual shift that is taking hold in employment discrimination law”).
9. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)). The Act is retroactive and applies “to all claims of
discrimination in compensation under title [sic] VII . . . that are pending on or after”
May 28, 2007, the date of the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter decision. Id. § 6.
10. Id. § 3(A). The Ledbetter Act also amends the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. Id. §§ 4-5. The Ledbetter Act defines the accrual of a pay discrimination claim as
“each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid.” Id. §3(A). It does not address
the timeliness of discrimination claims based on a pattern or practice of unlawful acts or
those based on termination or failure to hire, transfer or promote. See Leach v. Baylor Coll.
of Med., No. H-07-0921, 2009 WL 385450, at *17 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2009) (“The rule set
out in Ledbetter . . . — that ‘current effects alone cannot breathe new life into prior un-
charged discrimination’ — is still binding law for Title VII disparate treatment cases in-
volving discrete acts other than pay.”); see also Jason R. Bent, What the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act Doesn’t Do: “Discrete Acts” and the Future of Pattern or Practice Litigation,
33 RUTGERS L. REV. 31, 32-33 (2009) (pointing out that the Ledbetter Act only addresses
filing deadlines for pay discrimination, and does not address the timeliness of other dis-
crimination charges, “such as termination, failure to hire, failure to transfer, or failure
to promote”). The Supreme Court decisions on these issues, therefore, are unaffected by
this legislation. Leach, 2009 WL 385450, at *17 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980)). The
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006), is another avenue of redress for victims
of pay discrimination and allows each new paycheck to retrigger the applicable limitations
period. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 658 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), superseded by statute,
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 3. The Equal Pay Act, however, “provides no relief when
the pay discrimination charged is based on race, religion, national origin, age, or
disability.” Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 658 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
11. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 649-50.
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the workplace,”13 the law needs to incorporate a rule that allows a
limitations period to begin when the discrimination is, or should be,
discovered.14 Despite a proposal to do so, Congress did not explicitly
incorporate the discovery rule in the Ledbetter Act but, importantly,
it did not preclude its application either.15 By its terms, the Act allows
the receipt of each paycheck to begin anew the running of the limi-
tations period, but it is silent on how a victim’s inability to discover
discrimination may affect the claim.16 This silence allows and even
invites application of the discovery rule.17
This article, therefore, proposes that the discovery rule be incor-
porated into Title VII pay discrimination claims and concludes that
incorporating the rule will effectuate the purposes of Title VII without
compromising the protections afforded by the statute’s limitations
period.18 Section I reviews the reasons for limitations periods in
13. Id. at 649.
14. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258 (holding that the statue of limitations began to run “at
the time the [allegedly discriminatory] tenure decision was made and communicated”)
(emphasis added); see also Nancy Zisk, In the Wake of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Company: Applying the Discovery Rule to Determine the Start of the Limitations
Period For Pay Discrimination Claims, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 137, 144 (2009)
(stating that because it can take such a long time for employees to become aware of pay
disparities, “the limitations period . . . should be analyzed in reference to these claims”
instead of by each specific discriminatory act); Alyssa B. Minsky, Note, Employment
Discrimination Law in the Wake of Ledbetter: A Recommended Approach, 42 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 239, 255 (2008) (explaining that a discovery rule would only start the Title VII
statute of limitations when “the plaintiff became aware, or reasonably should have become
aware, of the facts that gave use to the cause of action”).
15. See 155 CONG. REC. S401, 588 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 2009) (reflecting failed Amendment
No. 25, the “Title VII Fairness Act,” presented by Senator Hutchison proposing to incor-
porate a “discovery rule” into the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009). Congress’s failure
to include any language regarding the discovery rule opens the door for its application
here. See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the discovery rule “is read into statutes of limitations in federal-question cases . . .
in the absence of a contrary directive from Congress”).
16. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
17. See Cada, 920 F.2d at 450 (“[T]he discovery rule of federal common law . . . is read
into statutes of limitations in federal question cases . . . in the absence of a contrary
directive from Congress.”).
18. See, e.g., Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256-57 (implicitly applying the discovery rule to Title
VII claim while noting that the statute’s limitations period guarantees “the protection
of the civil rights laws to those who promptly assert their rights [and] protect[s] em-
ployers from the burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that are
long past”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 348 (1977) (“The
primary purpose of Title VII was ‘to assure equality of employment opportunities and
to eliminate . . . discriminatory practices and devices . . . .’ ”) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973)); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
418 (1975) (“It is . . . the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered
on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”); Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran
& Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying the discovery rule to Title VII
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general and specifically as defined by Title VII and the problems
that arise when a wrongful act is hard to discern. Section II exam-
ines the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. that it overruled.19
Section III reviews the cases that have already considered the reach
of the Ledbetter Act and, while none were confronted with a discov-
ery issue, neither did they foreclose the application of the discovery
rule. Section IV reviews the decisions that have applied the discovery
rule to discrimination cases and offers an example where Congress
amended a statute to include the discovery rule in cases of identity
theft, where the wrong is difficult to discover. The final section con-
cludes that the Ledbetter Act does not foreclose the application of the
discovery rule to pay discrimination cases and that Title VII’s goals
will be best served when the discovery rule is consistently applied to
these claims.
I. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS: THE PROTECTIONS THEY AFFORD AND
THE PROBLEMS THEY CREATE WHEN UNLAWFUL CONDUCT IS HARD
TO DISCERN
Statutes of limitations serve the important purpose of encourag-
ing “the prompt presentation of claims.” 20 A statute of limitations
was described by the Supreme Court in 1828 as “a wise and benefi-
cial law . . . to afford security against stale demands, after the true
state of the transaction may have been forgotten, or be incapable of
explanation, by reason of the death or removal of witnesses.” 21 Specif-
ically applied to employment claims, “limitations periods, while guar-
anteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those who promptly
assert their rights, also protect employers from the burden of defend-
ing claims arising from employment decisions that are long past.” 22
Congress defined a very short limitations period for claims brought
under Title VII.23 In order to bring a Title VII claim in federal district
claim while acknowledging the need for plaintiff’s “reasonable diligence” in discovering
the wrong).
19. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by
statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 3.
20. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
21. Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 351, 360 (1828).
22. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256-57; accord Kara M. Farina, Comment, When Does
Discrimination “Occur?”: The Supreme Court’s Limitation on an Employee’s Ability to
Challenge Discriminatory Pay Under Title VII, 38 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REV. 249, 279
n.193 (2008) (noting that “[s]tatutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness
to defendants”).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006).
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court, a plaintiff must first file a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC within 180 days from the date of the unlawful employment
practice, or 300 days in states that have human rights agencies.24 A
discrimination claim “is time barred if it is not filed within these
time limits.” 25
Recognizing Congress’s definition of the very short limitations
period governing Title VII claims, the Supreme Court noted: “[b]y
choosing what are obviously quite short deadlines, Congress clearly
intended to encourage the prompt processing of all charges of em-
ployment discrimination.” 26 The Court has also noted that the short
deadlines reflect “Congress’ strong preference for the prompt reso-
lution of employment discrimination allegations through voluntary
conciliation and cooperation.” 27 Although noble goals, “conciliation
and cooperation” may be impossible, given the “realities of the work-
place,” where employees have no idea how their salaries compare to
the salaries of their coworkers.28
In much of corporate America, it is considered bad taste for
American employees to discuss how much they earn.29 In some work-
places, in fact, it is against company policy for employees to share sal-
ary information with each other, and a breach of this policy is grounds
for termination.30 Even where there is no formal policy against dis-
cussing salaries, “[i]t is not unusual . . . for management to decline
24. Id.; see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (noting that
to meet “the jurisdictional prerequisites to a federal action” one must “timely [file] charges
of employment discrimination with the Commission”); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 (2002) (“[I]n a State that has an entity with the
authority to grant or seek relief with respect to the alleged unlawful practice, an em-
ployee who initially files a grievance with that agency must file the charge with the
EEOC within 300 days of the employment practice; in all other States, the charge must
be filed within 180 days.”); Laquaglia v. Rio Hotel & Casino, Inc., 186 F.3d 1172, 1174
(9th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that “[c]harging parties have the benefit of the 300-day
time limit for filing their federal claims even when they have missed the state’s filing
deadline for submitting those claims to the state deferral agency”); accord Oshiver v.
Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1994).
25. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109.
26. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980).
27. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 630 (2007), superseded
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
28. Id. at 649-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely,
“Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way”: Workplace Social Norms and the Law,
25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 167, 168 (2004) (discussing the fact that individuals in the
United States are averse to revealing their salaries as a result of American social norms).
29. Bierman & Gely, supra note 28, at 168.
30. See id. at 171 (citing results of a study finding that one-third of private sector
employers have adopted rules against employee salary discussions); see also 155 CONG.
REC. S673, 694 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (contending that pay
discrimination is often intentionally concealed).
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to publish employee pay levels, or for employees to keep private their
own salaries.” 31 There are many reasons why employers, as well as
employees, may want to keep salary information private, and these
reasons can be “quite complex.” 32 Privacy rules and expectations
may serve a number of legitimate purposes for both employers and
employees,33 but, regardless of the reasons, expectations of privacy
make certain one thing: employees often have no idea what any other
employee in his or her workplace earns.34
Accordingly, when an employer pays members of a protected class
lower salaries than it pays their coworkers, it is likely that the victims
of the discrimination will be unaware of it, and it is precisely this ig-
norance that perpetuates the kind of pay discrimination that Title VII
was intended to correct.35 The plaintiff in Ledbetter had the opportu-
nity to litigate the issue of whether the limitations period can begin
to run before a victim is aware of, or should be aware of, the discrimi-
natory action, but she did not raise it.36 Congress had the opportunity
to amend the law to take into account the difficulty of discovering
an employer’s discriminatory practices, and, despite considering its
adoption, it did not include it in the recently enacted legislation.37
The following section will examine Congress’s attempt to “restore the
law [as it existed]” 38 before the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., and the facts facing the plaintiff in
that case.39
II. THE LILLY LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT AND THE SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION THAT IT OVERRULED
In the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Congress defined the
trigger of Title VII’s limitations period as the receipt of each new
31. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 649-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Goodwin v. General
Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 2002)) (discussing employee who dis-
covered pay disparity seven years after a pay-setting decision was made, and only by
finding the information in a printout left on her desk); see McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 296 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing employee
who learned of pay disparity from a newspaper report).
32. Bierman & Gely, supra note 28, at 176 n.71.
33. See, e.g., id. at 177-78 (discussing the idea that pay secrecy rules may help limit
workplace conflict).
34. See id. at 175 (acknowledging the “code of silence” in the United States regarding
pay levels).
35. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 623 (majority opinion).
37. 155 CONG. REC. S401, 588 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hutchison);
see Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(3)) (failing to adopt Sen. Hutchison’s amendment).
38. 155 CONG. REC. S401, 557 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 2009) (statement of Sen. Mikulski,
cosponsor of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act).
39. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 518.
8 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 16:001
paycheck issued pursuant to a discriminatory pay-setting decision.40
The Act identifies certain “unlawful employment practice[s]” to clar-
ify what triggers the limitations periods under the discrimination
statutes.41 These practices include:
when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is
adopted, when an individual becomes subject to a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, or when an individual is
affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision
or other practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other
compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a
decision or other practice.42
With these provisions, Congress overruled the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. in an effort to
reestablish “the robust application of the civil rights law that
Congress intended.” 43
By its terms, the new law grants a plaintiff like Lilly Ledbetter
more time to discover that discrimination has occurred, and allows
that plaintiff to sue if she discovers the discrimination when she
compares her paycheck to a coworker’s paycheck, but it ignores the
“realities of wage discrimination,” 44 where an employee may have no
idea how her paycheck compares with those of her coworkers.45 The
plaintiff in the Ledbetter case “was a supervisor at Goodyear Tire and
Rubber’s plant in Gadsden, Alabama, from 1979 until her retirement
in 1998.” 46 She worked for the latter part of her career as an area
manager, “a position largely occupied by men.” 47 When she began as
a manager, her salary was commensurate with the salaries earned
by men in the same jobs, but over time, “her pay slipped in compari-
son to the pay of male area managers with equal or less seniority.” 48
She claimed she received poor performance evaluations “because
40. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 3(A). The Act also amends other discrimination
statutes. See supra notes 8, 10 for a list of the affected statutes.
41. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 3(A).
42. Id. This amendment to Title VII is retroactive to May 28, 2007, id. § 6, the date
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618.
43. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act § 2(2); see also Darensburg v. Metro. Transp. Comm’n,
611 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1040 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing the Ledbetter Act and quoting
Congress’s intent to restore the “robust application of the civil rights law”).
44. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 654 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 649-50.
46. Id. at 643. The recitation of the facts of the case, infra notes 47-60 and accom-
panying text, comes from the author’s earlier article addressing the Court’s decision. See
Zisk, supra note 14, at 144-46.
47. Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 550 U.S. at 643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
48. Id.
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of her sex” and that “as a result of these evaluations her pay was
not increased as much as it would have been if she had been evalu-
ated fairly.” 49
The discrepancy between Ledbetter’s pay and the pay of others
took years to grow.50 This alone might have made it difficult for
Ledbetter to identify a triggering point for the limitations period to
begin to run.51 A bigger impediment to identifying that she had been
discriminated against or that her period for filing a claim had begun,
however, may have been that, even after receiving negative perfor-
mance evaluations, she continued to receive pay increases.52 As ex-
plained by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, with one exception,
her supervisor “consistently ranked Ledbetter at or near the bottom
of her co-workers in terms of performance.” 53 Despite these negative
evaluations, however, her supervisor “suggested, and she received,
a 5.28% increase over her existing salary, the largest percentage in-
crease given to any Area Manager.” 54 Thus, it would be easy to miss
that these evaluations amounted to “acts” or “occurrences” that have
triggered a limitations period.55
In addition to the pay increases she received, Ledbetter also got
mixed messages from her supervisors about the reasons for the salary
decisions that were made. When she did not receive a raise one year,
she was told that her performance was “sub-standard,” 56 but there
was no indication that the negative evaluation was based on her sex.57
Moreover, her denial of a pay raise was in the midst of employee lay-
offs, which included a “ ‘long list’ of people in departments all over the
plant” and she was encouraged just to be able to retain her employ-
ment.58 Far from a “diminution in job status” that is required to start
the running of a limitations period, Ledbetter might well have thought
her job status was secure.59
49. Id. at 622 (majority opinion).
50. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Inc. (Ledbetter I), 421 F.3d 1169, 1173-74
(11th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
51. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 643, 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the
difficulty in recognizing the triggering point in pay disparity cases).
52. See Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at 1173 (noting Ledbetter’s receipt of pay increases
despite receiving negative performance evaluations).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the likelihood
that Ledbetter was unaware of the discrimination she faced).
56. Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at 1174.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. (discussing that only one day after Ledbetter was told she would be laid
off, a supervisor informed her that she would continue working as a substitute manager).
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Only after Ledbetter became aware that she was receiving pay-
checks that were smaller than those of her male counterparts did she
file a claim for discriminatory pay disparity.60 The district court, over
the objections of the defendant employer based on the timing of her
charge, allowed Ledbetter’s Title VII claim to proceed to trial, at which
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, finding that it
was “more likely than not that Defendant paid Plaintiff an unequal
salary because of her sex.” 61 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision not to grant the defen-
dant judgment as a matter of law, finding that the evidence was in-
sufficient to prove that discriminatory intent motivated the only two
pay decisions that were made within the limitations period.62 On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff did not contest the Court
of Appeals’ holding that there was no discriminatory intent when
the paychecks were issued, but relied on the receipt of disparate pay
to justify her claims and bring them within the limitations period.63
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that each
paycheck gave rise to a new claim.64
Despite the difficulty Lilly Ledbetter faced in discovering the
pay differential between her and her male coworkers, the Court
expressly refused to consider whether the National Railroad Passen-
ger Corp. v. Morgan65 discovery rule would apply to a Title VII case.66
It did not clarify what the precise “pay-setting decision” had been or
how that decision would have been understood by the plaintiff,
because the question was not before it.67 The question was clearly
articulated, however, by the Court’s dissenting Justices68 and raised
by commentators after the decision was rendered.69 Congress took
action almost immediately to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision
60. Id. at 1175.
61. Id. at 1176 (quoting jury’s special verdict form).
62. Id. at 1189-90.
63. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 623 (2007) superseded
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
64. Id. at 637.
65. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
66. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 642 n.10.
67. Id. at 637.
68. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined in the dissent, written by Justice
Ginsburg, which focused in large part on the “problem of concealed pay discrimination.”
Id. at 643, 650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69. See, e.g., Zisk, supra note 14, at 146 (questioning what the court meant by “pay-
setting decision”); Minsky, supra note 14, at 250 (noting the Court’s acknowledgment that
“Ledbetter did not initially realize she was the victim of discrimination”).
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in this case,70 but it responded only to the very narrow issue ad-
dressed by the Court.71
Congress could have gone further.72 Because “specific and dis-
crete acts of wage-based discrimination may be very difficult to de-
tect within the 180-day filing period provided under title [sic] VII,” 73
Senator Hutchison proposed language that would have incorporated
the discovery rule into Title VII.74 Under an ordinary discovery rule,
“the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff
knows or reasonably should have known of the injury and the con-
nection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct.” 75 Consis-
tent with this definition, Senator Hutchison’s amendment would have
allowed a victim of discrimination to bring a claim within the appli-
cable 180 days or 300 days from the time that “the person aggrieved
has, or should be expected to have, enough information to support a
reasonable suspicion of such discrimination.” 76
70. H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007) (as introduced to the House of Representatives,
June 22, 2007).
71. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(3)) (signed by President Obama on January 29, 2009).
The bill declared as congressional findings that:
The Supreme Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. significantly
impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation that
Congress established and that have been bedrock principles of American law
for decades. The Ledbetter decision undermines those statutory protections
by unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can
challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions or other
practices, contrary to the intent of Congress.
Id. § 2(1) (citations omitted); see 155 CONG. REC. S401, 558 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 2009)
(statement of Sen. Mikulski, cosponsor of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act) (“We want
to be sure we keep the courthouse door open. What we do is simply restore the law as it
existed before the recent Supreme Court decision so that we make sure the statute of
limitations runs from the date of the actual payment of a discriminatory wage, not just
from the time of hiring.”); 155 CONG. REC. S673, 695 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2009) (statement
of Sen. Leahy, Chair, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Congress passed title [sic] VII of the
Civil Rights Act to protect employees against discrimination with respect to com-
pensation because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin but the
Supreme Court’s Ledbetter decision goes against both the spirit and clear intent of our
antidiscrimination laws.”).
72. See 155 CONG. REC. S401, 588 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 2009) (statement of Sen.
Hutchison) (proposing to incorporate a discovery rule into the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009).
73. 155 CONG. REC. S673, 695 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. Voinovich).
74. 155 CONG. REC. S401, 588 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
75. Minsky, supra note 14, at 243 n.34; see Hamilton v. Smith, 773 F.2d 461, 464 (2d
Cir. 1985) (citing Connecticut law equating “injury” with “actionable harm” and holding
that the applicable limitations period begins to run “when the plaintiff discovers both
that he has suffered physical harm and the causal connection between that harm and
the alleged negligent conduct of the defendant”).
76. 155 CONG. REC. S401, 588 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
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Congress did not adopt this amendment, but the language ulti-
mately passed contains nothing that prohibits the application of the
discovery rule to pay discrimination claims.77 Because there is no
“contrary directive from Congress,” the discovery rule can be, and
should be, applied to pay discrimination claims.78 The next section
reviews the cases that have already considered the reach of the
Ledbetter Act and, while none were confronted with a discovery issue,
none foreclosed the application of the discovery rule.
III. THE LEDBETTER FAIR PAY ACT APPLIED
Immediately after the enactment of the Ledbetter Act, the
Supreme Court considered its effect.79 While it could have remanded
the case to give the lower court a chance to consider the effect of the
new law,80 the Court reviewed the legislation and limited its reach.81
In AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, the Supreme Court was faced with the
question whether pension plans based on a seniority system which
granted less service credit for pregnancy-related leave than it did for
other medical leave violated Title VII.82 Even though the plaintiffs,
who took leave for pregnancy-related conditions, received pension
payments that were lower than those of their coworkers who missed
work for other medical conditions,83 the Court held that there was
no claim under Title VII, even as amended.84 Because the seniority
systems were not illegal when they were put in place, the Court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs were not “affected by application of a discrim-
inatory compensation decision or other practice,” thereby making
the Ledbetter Act inapplicable.85
In Hulteen, the employees complained about the way AT&T
treated pregnancy leave in awarding pension benefits.86 Prior to
77. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
78. See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the discovery rule is “read into statutes of limitations in federal-question cases . . .
in the absence of a contrary directive from Congress”).
79. See AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1962, 1972-73 (2009)
(accepting supplemental briefing to consider the effect of the recent amendment).
80. Neal D. Mollen & Dara H. Freling, Supreme Court Trims Reach of Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act of 2009 and Reaffirms Settled Law on Retroactive Application of Statutes,
STAY CURRENT(Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walter LLP, Washington, D.C.), May 2009 at
1, available at http://www.paulhastings.com/publicationDetail.aspx?PublicationId=1318.
81. Hulteen, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1972-73.
82. Id. at 1966.
83. Id. at 1967.
84. Id. at 1973.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1967.
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Title VII’s amendment making discrimination based on pregnancy-
related conditions unlawful, AT&T treated leave for pregnancy as
personal, rather than disability, leave.87 Because the company gave
full service credit for disability leave and only a maximum of thirty
days for personal leave, employees who missed work for pregnancy-
related conditions received fewer seniority credits for pension benefits
than those who missed work for other health-related reasons.88 This
was legal before the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) amended
Title VII.89
In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by passing the PDA.90 The
PDA made “clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy-related
conditions less favorably than other medical conditions.” 91 With the
enactment of the PDA, AT&T changed its practice and gave women
who took maternity leave the same seniority credits as it gave to em-
ployees who took other medical leave, but the company did not “make
any retroactive adjustments to the service credit calculations of women
who had been subject to the pre-PDA personnel policies.” 92 As a re-
sult, women who had missed work for pregnancy-related conditions
prior to the passage of the PDA accrued less time toward their pen-
sions than those who missed work for other medical conditions and,
accordingly, received lower retirement benefits than the other em-
ployees who had taken non-maternity medical leave.93
Four of these women “filed charges of discrimination with the
[EEOC], alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and pregnancy
in violation of Title VII.” 94 The EEOC determined that there was
reasonable cause to believe that AT&T had discriminated against
respondent Hulteen and “a class of other similarly-situated female
employees whose adjusted [commencement of service] date has
been used to determine eligibility for a service or disability pension,
the amount of pension benefits, and eligibility for certain other
benefits and programs, including early retirement offerings.” 95
The EEOC issued a right to sue letter, and Hulteen subsequently
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
87. Id. at 1966-67.
88. Id. at 1967.
89. Id.
90. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, S. 995, 95th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1978) (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006)).
91. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1962, 1967 (2009) (quoting Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citation omitted).
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District of California.96 Based on a prior Ninth Circuit decision,97
the District Court held, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, that Title VII
is violated “where post-PDA retirement eligibility calculations in-
corporated pre-PDA accrual rules that differentiated on the basis of
pregnancy.” 98 Noting a conflict in the circuits, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari “in order to resolve this split.” 99 Relying on the fact
that AT&T’s seniority system was “bona fide”100 and that Title VII
insulates these systems from challenge,101 the Court held that no
violation occurred.102
While this case was pending, Congress passed the Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act.103 The Court accepted supplemental briefing on the case,
even after oral arguments had been held, to consider “the possible
effect on this case of the recent amendment to” Title VII.104 The plain-
tiff Hulteen argued that each time she was paid a pension benefit, she
was “affected by application of a discriminatory compensation deci-
sion or other practice,” as defined by the Ledbetter Act.105 It is note-
worthy that the Court considered this issue at all.106 Because the
96. Id.
97. Pallas v. Pacific Bell, 940 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1991).
98. Hulteen, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1967-68. The Ninth Circuit had earlier
affirmed the District Court’s holding en banc and held that its decision in Pallas, that
“calculation of service credit excluding time spent on pregnancy leave violates Title VII,”
was correct. Hulteen v. AT&T Corp., 498 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d, 556
U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1962 (2009).
99. Hulteen, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1968 (noting a circuit split in the Ninth,
Sixth, and Seventh circuits); cf. Leffman v. Sprint Corp., 481 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2007)
(holding claim barred by statute of limitations, as well as by the seniority provision of
Title VII); Ameritech Benefit Plan Comm. v. Comm’n Workers of Am., 220 F.3d 814
(7th Cir. 2000) (finding no Title VII violation given the existence of a bona fide seniority
system); Pallas, 940 F.2d at 1324 (finding plaintiff’s complaint stated valid cause of
action under Title VII).
100. Hulteen, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1970 (defining a “bona fide” system as
having “no discriminatory terms”).
101. Section 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards
of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges or employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . system . . . provided that such differences
are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006).
102. Hulteen, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1973.
103. President Obama signed the legislation on January 29, 2009. See supra notes 9-10
and accompanying text.
104. Hulteen, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1972.
105. Id. at 1973 (quoting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2,
§ 3(A), 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A))).
106. See Mollen & Freling, supra note 80 (noting that “[t]he Court is not typically
eager to become the first appellate court to reach important questions of statutory
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Ledbetter Act was passed while the Hulteen case was pending, the
Court could have remanded the case to allow the lower court to
consider the Act’s reach.107 The Court retained the case, however, and
refused to extend the Act’s reach to the facts, holding that “AT&T’s
pre-PDA decision not to award [her] service credit for pregnancy leave
was not discriminatory” and, therefore, the plaintiff was not “affected
by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice.”108 Accordingly, even though the plaintiff’s pension payments
were lower than the pension payments received by other employees
who missed work for other medical conditions, arguably just like the
salary payments Lilly Ledbetter received that were lower than her
coworkers’, Title VII afforded no relief.109
A number of federal district courts have also considered the scope
of the Ledbetter Act, and some of them have similarly construed the
Act narrowly.110 Others, however, have interpreted the Act to save
claims that would have failed under the old statutory regime.111 In
construction”).
107. Id.
108. Hulteen, 556 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1973 (quoting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act § 3(A)). The Court noted, however, that if AT&T had left its discriminatory policy in
place after the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Ledbetter Act may then
have allowed the plaintiffs to recover at least for two years before they filed their EEOC
charges. Id. at 1968, 1972.
109. Id. at 1967, 1971-72.
110. See, e.g., Mikula v. Allegheny County, 320 F. App’x 134, 137 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009)
(distinguishing a request for a raise in pay from the adoption of a discriminatory com-
pensation practice), rev’d on reh’g, No. 07-4023, 2009 WL 2889742 (3d Cir. Sept. 10, 2009);
EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 867, 876 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (limiting
reach of the Ledbetter Act to those circumstances enumerated in the statutory language
and concluding that the Ledbetter Act had no relevance to claims of sexual harassment);
Hines v. N. W. Va. Operations, No. 1:08CV144, 2009 WL 1228305, at *3 (N.D. W. Va.
May 1, 2009) (holding Ledbetter Fair Pay Act inapplicable to a claim over an arbitration
process where the “last discriminatory act” alleged by plaintiff occurred after the limi-
tations period expired); Leach v. Baylor Coll. of Med., No. H-07-0921, 2009 WL 385450,
at *19 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2009) (Ledbetter Act did not apply to a race discrimination claim
in which plaintiff alleged discriminatory assignment of job responsibilities with no asser-
tion that the discrimination affected pay); see also Maher v. Int’l Paper Co., 600 F. Supp.
2d 940, 950 n.5 (W.D. Mich. 2009) (describing the Act’s reach as limited to “the timeliness
of discriminatory compensation claims” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (2006); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (2006); and not ex-
tended to claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601
(2006)); Siri v. Princeton Club of N.Y., 874 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (noting
that Ledbetter Act does not apply to a claim of a continuing practice of discrimination
in the assignment of banquet work).
111. See, e.g., Gentry v. Jackson State Univ., 610 F. Supp. 2d 564, 566-67 (S.D. Miss.
2009) (noting that lower salary related to a denial of tenure that was outside the limita-
tions period was a violation under Title VII, as amended by the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act);
Shockley v. Minner, No. 06-478 JJF, 2009 WL 866792, at *1 (D. Del. Mar. 31, 2009)
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those cases where the courts have decided the Act does not apply, the
courts have noted either that no disparity in pay was alleged,112 or
that the alleged discrimination was a continuing violation or sexual
harassment, rather than a “discrete act.”113
In a case with facts similar to facts in a case that was dismissed
by the Supreme Court before the Ledbetter Act was passed,114 a fed-
eral district court relied on the Ledbetter Act to allow the claim.115
In Gentry v. Jackson State University, the plaintiff claimed that she
“was denied tenure and a related salary increase because of her gen-
der, in violation of Title VII.”116 The defendant moved for summary
judgment based on statute of limitations grounds because the plain-
tiff was denied tenure in 2004, but waited until 2006 to file a charge
of discrimination with the EEOC, well after the 180 day limit provided
(denying defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act “explicitly overruled the decision and logic of the Ledbetter decision”); Knox v.
Centric Group, LLC, No. 3:06-CV-555-RAM, 2009 WL 875513, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 30,
2009) (plaintiff’s claim that bonus program instituted outside the limitations period that
continued to pay female employees less than male employees was timely filed under the
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act); Bush v. Orange County Corr. Dep’t, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1296
(M.D. Fla. 2009) (noting that Ledbetter Act saves plaintiffs’ claims of pay discrimination
based on race and gender that would “plainly be barred” under the Ledbetter decision).
The court in Knox also noted that the plaintiff’s claim challenged a pay system that was
administered during the statutory period and was “facially discriminatory.” Knox, 2009
WL 875513, at *4. The court found that “[i]t is a well-settled proposition that ‘an employer
violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging period whenever the employer issues
paychecks using a discriminatory pay structure.’ ” Id. (quoting Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 637 (2007)). The court concluded, therefore, that “regardless
of the passage of the Act, [the] [p]laintiff’s disparate pay claims are not time-barred.” Id.
See also Aspilaire v. Wyeth Pharm. Inc., 612 F. Supp. 2d 289, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on § 1981 claim, but assuming that plaintiff’s
claim that she was not paid at the proper rate was timely “because the decision not to pay
plaintiff at the [proper rate], which decision was made prior to the statutory period,
affected the amount of plaintiff’s paychecks during the statutory period”); Vuong v. N.Y.
Life Ins. Co., No. 03 Civ. 1075(TPG), 2009 WL 306391, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2009) (“The
issue of when the unlawful employment practice occurs with respect to compensation is
the subject of legislation, which became effective only a few days ago . . . .”).
112. See Hines, 2009 WL 1228305, at *2 n.9 (finding that Ledbetter Act does not apply
to a claim of racial discrimination with no claim of discriminatory compensation); Leach,
2009 WL 385450, at *17-*18 (finding that Ledbetter Act did not apply to a race discrimi-
nation claim in which plaintiff alleged discriminatory assignment of job responsibilities
with no assertion that the discrimination affected pay). But see Vuong, 2009 WL 306391,
at *8-*9 (dismissing a claim over a failure to promote but allowing a claim for discrimi-
natory pay practice).
113. See CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (limiting reach of the
Ledbetter Act to those circumstances enumerated in the statutory language and
concluding that the Ledbetter Act had no relevance to claims of sexual harassment); Siri,
874 N.Y.S.2d at 409 n.10, 410 (noting that Ledbetter Act does not apply to a claim of a
continuing practice of discrimination in the assignment of banquet work).
114. Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 252-56 (1980).
115. Gentry v. Jackson State Univ., 610 F. Supp. 2d 564, 566-67 (S.D. Miss. 2009).
116. Id. at 565.
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by Title VII.117 Notably, the court decided that the employee’s claim
could withstand the statute of limitations defense.118 This holding
is notable, because it is in direct contrast with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Delaware State College v. Ricks,119 decided prior to the
passage of the Ledbetter Act and barring the employee’s claim.120 In
Ricks, a college librarian alleged that he had been discharged because
of his national origin.121 The college denied tenure to Ricks, but offered
him a one-year, nonrenewable contract that expired a little over a year
after his tenure was denied.122 Ricks filed a charge with the EEOC
almost a year after the denial of his tenure, when his finite contract
was about to expire.123 He argued that the EEOC charging period ran
from the date of his actual termination rather than from the date
when tenure was denied.124 The Court rejected his argument, holding
that the limitations period began to run when “the tenure decision
was made and communicated to” the employee.125
Although it made no mention of the Ricks case and did not try
to distinguish it, the Gentry court came to the opposite result.126
Despite its seemingly expansive reading of the Ledbetter Act, the
Gentry court did acknowledge the limits of it, stating that “[t]he rule
set out in Ledbetter and prior cases — that ‘current effects alone can-
not breathe new life into prior uncharged discrimination’ — is still
binding law for Title VII disparate treatment cases involving discrete
acts other than pay.”127 The court distinguished the case before it from
cases involving other discrete acts, noting that “the Supreme Court’s
Ledbetter decision continues to provide the applicable rule for discrete
discriminatory acts ‘other than pay,’ ” but nonetheless “is not helpful
in this case.”128 The court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s denial of
tenure was a “discrete” act, but emphasized that the plaintiff “asserted
that the denial of tenure also denied her a salary increase and hence
was a compensation decision.”129
117. Id. at 566.
118. Id. at 566-67.
119. 449 U.S. 250.
120. Id. at 258.
121. Id. at 254.
122. Id. at 252-53.
123. Id. at 254.
124. Id. at 257.
125. Id. at 258.
126. Gentry v. Jackson State Univ., 610 F. Supp. 2d 564, 566-67 (S.D. Miss. 2009).
127. Id. at 566 (quoting Leach v. Baylor Coll. of Med., No. H-07-0921, 2009 WL 385450,
at *17 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 17, 2009)).
128. Id. (citing Leach, 2009 WL 385450, at *17).
129. Id. at 567.
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Leach v. Baylor College of Medicine130 is an example to the con-
trary. In that case, the plaintiff complained that he was discriminated
against because of his race. The plaintiff was an African American phy-
sician who alleged that he was expected to satisfy certain requirements
that were not required of any other Baylor faculty member.131 Because
the plaintiff’s claims were not over discrete discriminatory acts that
related to pay, the court concluded that the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
did not control.132 Similarly, in Vuong v. New York Life Insurance
Company,133 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that an employee’s charge of discrimi-
nation filed over four years after an employer’s failure to promote him
was untimely because the failure to promote was a “discrete” act, and
“plaintiff knew what was occurring at that time.”134
In Vuong, the plaintiff, who was Chinese, began working for
the defendant employer as an agent selling life insurance.135 He was
promoted to Sales Manager, then to Associate General Manager,
and subsequently to co-Managing Partner of a large, regional office.136
Plaintiff claimed that a promise was made to him that the co-manag-
ing arrangement was temporary and that he would “take the office
as a whole,” but that change was never made.137 Plaintiff claimed
that the company’s failure to appoint him as Managing Partner and
his subsequent termination were discriminatory because of his race
and national origin.138 He also alleged that he was paid less than a
Caucasian employee who held the same position he held.139
The plaintiff, however, waited over three years to file a charge
of discrimination, which was well beyond the 300-day limitations
period that applied to his claim.140 Relying on the Supreme Court’s
130. Leach, 2009 WL 385450.
131. Id. at *15. According to the plaintiff’s claims, he was the “only . . . faculty member
expected to devote 35 or more hours per week at the VA Medical Center, develop a clinical
practice, and obtain research funding.” Id. He also claimed that a comment directed at
him about “Michael Jackson” was “direct evidence of racial discrimination.” Id.
132. Id. at *17; accord Mikula v. Allegheny County, 320 F. App’x 134, 137 n.1 (3d Cir.
2009) (distinguishing a request for a raise in pay from the adoption of a discriminatory
compensation practice); Rowland v. Certainteed Corp., No. 08-3671, 2009 WL 1444413,
at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2009) (holding that “failure to promote” claim is not saved by the
Ledbetter Act); EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 867, 869 (N.D. Iowa
2009) (limiting reach of the Ledbetter Act to those circumstances enumerated in the
statutory language and concluding that the Ledbetter Act had no relevance to claims of
sexual harassment).
133. No. 03 Civ. 1075(TPG), 2009 WL 306391 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2009).
134. Id. at *8.
135. Id. at *1.
136. Id. at *1-*2.
137. Id. at *2, *4.
138. Id. at *1.
139. Id. at *1, *3.
140. See id. at *7 (explaining that California’s Department of Fair Employment and
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definition of a failure to promote as a “discrete” act,141 but also noting
that the “plaintiff knew what was occurring at that time,”142 the
district court concluded that the 300-day limitations period began
to run when the company failed to promote the plaintiff and, there-
fore, that the plaintiff’s failure-to-promote claim was time-barred.143
The court separately considered the plaintiff’s claim that the allo-
cation of pay between himself and a Caucasian employee was discrim-
inatory.144 Because the claim was “with respect to compensation,”
the court noted the passage of the Ledbetter Act and the fact that it
“clearly governs the compensation claim in the instant case.”145 Al-
though the employer’s decision to allocate the plaintiff’s pay and the
pay of his coworker was made outside of the limitations period, the
“[p]laintiff claim[ed] that the paychecks he received during the charg-
ing period would have been larger if [his employer] had not made the
discriminatory decision.”146 Accordingly, based on the Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act, the court allowed that claim to survive the defendant em-
ployer’s motion for summary judgment.147
In the cases already decided under the Ledbetter Act, there was
no issue about when the discriminatory conduct occurred or whether
the plaintiff could have reasonably discovered it.148 Although discovery
of the discriminatory practice was not at issue in Vuong, the court
addressed it nevertheless.149 Deciding that the plaintiff’s failure to
promote claim was time-barred, the court noted that when he was not
promoted, the “plaintiff knew what was occurring at that time.”150
Given the facts before it, the court did not have to consider whether
the limitations period would be triggered if the plaintiff was un-
aware of the discriminatory act but suggested that the limitations
Housing, the agency with the authority to handle employment discrimination claims, has
a work-sharing agreement with the EEOC, under which “a charge filed with the EEOC
will automatically be deemed filed” with the state agency and that based on this agree-
ment, the court determined the limitations period to be 300 days).
141. Id. (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)).
142. Id. at *8.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *2, *8.
145. Id. at *8-*9.
146. Id. at *9.
147. See id. (declaring that the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act makes such a claim timely).
148. See, e.g., Gentry v. Jackson State Univ., 610 F. Supp. 2d 564, 565, 567 (S.D. Miss.
2009) (explaining that the plaintiff knew that her employer denied her tenure and a
related salary increase); cf. Vuong v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 03 Civ. 1075(TPG), 2009 WL
306391, at *7-*8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2009) (explaining that plaintiff knew that his
employer was treating him differently when employer failed to promote plaintiff as the
sole Managing Partner).
149. Vuong, 2009 WL 306391, at *8.
150. Id.
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period would not, in fact, begin to run.151 Specifically, the court stated:
“[i]ndeed, there are circumstances where a plaintiff is unaware for
some time that his employer acted with discriminatory intent in
taking an adverse employment action.”152 Under these circumstances,
the claim would accrue “from the date the employee ‘knows or has rea-
son to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.’ ”153 Nothing
in the Ledbetter Act forecloses this result, and, since Congress had
the opportunity to prohibit the application of the discovery rule but
did not, the rule can, and should, apply.154 The cases that have al-
ready applied the rule are therefore instructive and their reasoning
is considered below.
IV. THE DISCOVERY RULE IS APPLIED WITHOUT COMPROMISING
THE PROTECTION AGAINST THE LITIGATION OF STALE CLAIMS
A number of courts have considered the timing of the accrual of
discrimination claims, and the Supreme Court has implicitly acknowl-
edged the application of the discovery rule in Delaware State College
v. Ricks.155 The Court in Ricks held that the act of alleged discrimi-
nation occurred, and the limitations period began to run, “at the time
the tenure decision was made and communicated” to the affected em-
ployee.156 Lower courts have similarly defined the accrual of a claim
151. See id. at *7 (discussing the possibility that a plaintiff may not initially be aware
of discriminatory practices).
152. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 703 (2d Cir. 1994)) (decided under
sections 1983 and 1985 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1988)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (2006))).
154. See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that the discovery rule “is read into statutes of limitations in federal-question cases” absent
a contrary Congressional directive).
155. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
156. Id. at 258 (emphasis added); see also Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman,
38 F.3d 1380, 1390-91 (3d Cir. 1994) (applying discovery rule to a Title VII claim and
holding that limitations period began to run when employer informed plaintiff of her
discharge); Cada, 920 F.2d at 450, 452 (applying discovery rule to an age discrimination
claim and holding that limitations period triggered when employee discovered he had
been replaced by young and inexperienced person); McWilliams v. Escambia County Sch.
Bd., 658 F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying discovery rule to Title VII claim and hold-
ing that a teacher’s transfer and demotion triggered the limitations period in Title VII
case); Ohemeng v. Del. State Coll., 643 F. Supp. 1575, 1580-81 (D. Del. 1986) (applying
discovery rule to Title VII claim and finding an issue of fact as to the timing of plaintiff’s
discovery that a discriminatory act occurred because of the conflicting representations
made by defendant employer); cf. Braxton v. Erie County Dist. Att’y, No. 06-CV-311A,
2008 WL 4426021, at *5-*6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008) (noting the applicability of dis-
covery rule in Title VII claim but deciding there was “no need to resolve the question of
whether a discovery rule is applicable to plaintiff’s claim” in the absence of a fully-
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to be “when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that the
discriminatory act has occurred.”157 The “discriminatory act” could be
a denial of tenure as it was in Ricks,158 a termination,159 or a transfer
and demotion.160
Awareness of the act without more, however, may not be enough
to trigger the running of the limitations period.161 Where an em-
ployee is given mixed signals about the reasons for an employer’s
actions related to that employee, a cause of action does not neces-
sarily accrue.162 The point is illustrated by the facts in Ledbetter: the
plaintiff received pay increases even after receiving negative perfor-
mance evaluations.163 As more fully discussed above,164 Ledbetter re-
ceived mixed messages from her supervisors about how her salary
compared to her coworkers’ and the reasons for the employer’s salary
decisions.165 Ledbetter also had a reasonable belief that she was being
treated fairly and was even lucky to retain her job amidst other
company layoffs.166
The impact of these mixed signals was not at issue before the
Supreme Court in Ledbetter because the plaintiff did not argue that
application of the discovery rule “would change the outcome in her
case.”167 At least one court has noted, however, that mixed signals of
this type raise a question of fact as to whether the limitations period
for a Title VII claim has begun to run.168 In Ohemeng v. Delaware
State College, the plaintiff, a black naturalized American assistant
developed factual record).
157. Ohemeng, 643 F. Supp. at 1580 (quoting McWilliams, 658 F.2d at 330); accord
Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1386.
158. 449 U.S. at 257.
159. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554-55 (1977) (finding cause
of action accrued when employee was forced to resign when she got married).
160. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Escambia County Sch. Bd., 658 F.2d 326, 328 (5th Cir.
1981) (finding cause of action accrued when teacher was transferred and demoted).
161. Ohemeng, 643 F. Supp. at 1580.
162. See id. (noting the existence of a question of fact as to plaintiff’s knowledge of
discrimination).
163. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. (Ledbetter I), 421 F.3d 1169, 1173-74
(11th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
164. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text (presenting the background facts
of the Ledbetter case).
165. Ledbetter I, 421 F.3d at 1173-74.
166. Id. at 1174-75.
167. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642 n.10 (2007), super-
seded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
168. See Ohemeng v. Del. State Coll., 643 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (D. Del. 1986) (applying
discovery rule to Title VII claim and finding an issue of fact as to the timing of plaintiff’s
discovery that a discriminatory act occurred because of the conflicting representations
made by defendant employer).
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professor at a state college, was terminated and informed that his
termination was because of the college’s plan to “upgrade its teaching
staff.”169 Prior to his termination, Ohemeng had been given “excellent”
performance evaluations and renewed appointments for two consec-
utive academic years.170 Despite a clause in his contract that made
it a terminal one-year contract, the college reassured Ohemeng that
he did not have to worry about termination.171 The college informed
Ohemeng that he “needed to acquire an additional degree” to be eli-
gible for promotion and additional years of teaching “before he could
be considered for tenure.”172
Upon his termination, Ohemeng was told that his dismissal was
“because he did not have a doctoral degree” and, therefore, “did not
meet the long term needs of the college.”173 Several months later, how-
ever, the college advertised for assistant professors with the same
qualifications as Ohemeng and, seeing the advertisement, Ohemeng
realized for the first time that the actions taken by the college may
have been due to his race.174 Ohemeng maintained he was the subject
of derogatory racial slurs during his tenure at the college.175 Distin-
guishing the case from Ricks, where the plaintiff was given “an un-
broken array of negative decisions” prior to being notified of his ter-
mination,176 the Ohemeng court held that the plaintiff’s discovery of
the discrimination, and not simply notice of his termination, could
trigger the running of the limitations period.177 In light of “defendants’
seesaw representations to Ohemeng about his teaching future with
the college,” the court concluded that there was the possibility “that
he did not know he was being discriminated against” until he saw the
advertisement for his replacement.178 Accordingly, the court rejected
the defendants’ argument as a matter of law that the statute of limi-
tations had been triggered earlier.179
Implicit in this holding is the recognition that it is difficult for
victims of workplace discrimination to discover the discrimina-
169. Id. at 1576, 1580.
170. Id. at 1576-77.
171. Id. at 1577.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1577-78.
175. Id. at 1578.
176. Id. at 1580 (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 262 (1980)).
177. Id. at 1580-81.
178. Id.; accord Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that limitations period may be triggered when employee discovers he has been
replaced by young and inexperienced person).
179. Ohemeng, 643 F. Supp. at1580.
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tion.180 Even an opponent to the inclusion of the discovery rule in
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act had to concede that:
The reality is, many employers do not allow their employees to
learn how their compensation compares to their coworkers’. They
can hide it and hide it and hide it until these women finally re-
tire, pray that they never find out how they were discriminated
against, and then say when they are found out: Oh, my goodness
gracious, you should have filed suit earlier.181
Not incorporating the discovery rule “could lead to situations in which
an employer escapes liability simply because the person did not know
that a discriminatory act took place.”182
Allowing the discovery of discrimination to trigger the start of the
limitations period protects victims of discrimination, but it does not
mean that statutes of limitations will become meaningless or that
claims will be viable forever.183 By defining an objective rule that re-
quires that the plaintiff “should” have discovered the wrong, rather
than proof that the plaintiff actually discovered it, courts avoid open-
ended liability and the litigation of stale claims.184 A discovery rule
based on an objective standard “requires the plaintiff to take reason-
able measures to uncover the existence of injury.”185 Victims of dis-
180. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 649 (2007) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (noting that compensation discrimination is more difficult to identify than
discrimination relating to public events such as “promotions, transfers, hirings, and
firings”), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2,
§ 3, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
181. 155 CONG. REC. S673, 694 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy, Chair,
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary). See discussion infra notes 191-201 and accompanying text
for the arguments against the application of the discovery rule and the responses to
those arguments.
182. 155 CONG. REC. S673, 695 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. Voinovich).
183. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (construing the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1970) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2006)) and
describing the statute of limitations defense as a “meritorious defense, in itself serving
a public interest” (quoting Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938)));
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386-87 (3d Cir. 1994) (find-
ing awareness of actual injury, as distinguished from legal injury, sufficient to trigger
the statutory period); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1988)
(applying the discovery rule to a case under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(2006)), and noting need for “diligence” on the part of potential claimant to discover dis-
crimination and bring claim), vacated, Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997).
184. See Houghton, 863 F.2d at 1127 (stating that “[a] different rule would require
insufficient diligence on the part of potential claimants”).
185. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1390; accord Houghton, 863 F.2d at 1127.
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crimination who act with insufficient diligence to discover the discrim-
ination will be prevented from vindicating their rights.186
The discovery rule, in this way, functions to delay the initial run-
ning of the statutory limitations period, but only until the plaintiff
“has discovered or, by exercising reasonable diligence, should have
discovered” the wrong.187 Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that the discovery rule can apply without compromising the purposes
of Title VII’s limitations period.188 These rules, according to the Court,
“while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those
who promptly assert their rights, also protect employers from the
burden of defending claims arising from employment decisions that
are long past.”189 The discovery rule, therefore, offers a “sensible com-
promise” that respects the purposes of a limitations period and bal-
ances it against the rights of victims of discrimination to vindicate
their rights.190
Opponents of the application of the discovery rule argue that its
application will introduce uncertainty and inconsistency into the liti-
gation of claims.191 In addition to the protections afforded by the ob-
jective standard that should overcome these arguments, employers
have additional protections against stale claims that include “various
defenses” in cases where plaintiffs have not been diligent or where
there is “unreasonable or prejudicial delay.”192 In response to the con-
186. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1390.
187. Id. at 1386.
188. See Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-67 (1980) (noting that the dual
purpose of the Title VII limitations period is to protect employees’ civil rights assertions
while limiting employers’ stale defense burdens).
189. Id.
190. 155 CONG. REC. S673, 696 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. Voinovich).
Testifying in support of Sen. Hutchison’s proposed amendment to the Lilly Ledbetter
Act, Sen. Voinovich explained:
Because she recognizes that paycheck discrimination may not be obvious in
the modern workplace and that a bad actor should not benefit from hiding
such discrimination, Senator Hutchison crafted a sensible compromise. Under
the Hutchison amendment, a person could bring a claim under title [sic] VII
within 180 days after obtaining knowledge or information that the person
is the victim of discriminatory conduct. In other words, you don’t start the
180-day statute of limitations until the person knows or has reasonable sus-
picion that she is subject to a discriminatory wage. But once you know you
have been discriminated against, then it is your obligation to bring that to
the attention of the EEOC and start the process to obtain relief.
Id.
191. See id. at 699 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2009) (statement by Sen. Murkowski) (presenting
reasons against the application of the discovery rule).
192. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 657 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121-22 (2001)),
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 3, 123
Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)).
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cern over the litigation of stale claims in connection with a hostile
work environment claim, the Supreme Court has noted that applica-
tion of the discovery rule will not “leave employers defenseless against
employees” who bring stale claims.193 Defendants have always had,
and will continue to have, “recourse when a plaintiff unreasonably
delays filing a charge.”194 As Justice Ginsburg stated in Ledbetter,
“[d]octrines such as ‘waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling’ ‘allow us
to honor Title VII’s remedial purpose without negating the particu-
lar purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the
employer.’ ”195 Employers are additionally protected against open-
ended liability because the amount of lost income an employee can
recover is limited to that that could have been earned in the two years
prior to the filing of the discrimination claim, even if the discrimina-
tory decision was made years earlier.196
Laches offers employers further protection against the litigation
of stale claims.197 According to the Supreme Court, “an employer may
raise a laches defense, which bars a plaintiff from maintaining a suit
if he unreasonably delays in filing a suit and as a result harms the
defendant.”198 Implicating the availability of the laches defense to a
Title VII claim, one federal district court nonetheless allowed a claim
that was filed after a ninety-day EEOC limitations period had expired,
finding that the defendant employer failed to demonstrate how it had
“been prejudiced by lack of access to [the employee’s] EEOC file.”199
Although the EEOC claimed it had sent the plaintiff a right-to-sue
letter indicating she had ninety days in which to bring a complaint,
the plaintiff claimed she never received it.200 Observing that the
“[p]laintiff was diligent in keeping the office apprised of her change
193. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121.
194. Id.
195. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 657 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Morgan, 536 U.S.
at 121); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) (“By holding
compliance with the filing period to be not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII
suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires, we
honor the remedial purpose of the legislation as a whole without negating the particular
purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.”).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2006) (discussing the limitation of damages for
suits filed under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, -3 (2006)); see also Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 654
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing Title VII’s back pay liability provision).
197. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121; cf. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 398 (noting the importance of
“prompt notice to the employer” in filing a suit under Title VII).
198. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 121.
199. Knox v. Centric Group, LLC, No. 3:06-CV-555-RAM, 2009 WL 875513, at *3 (D.
Nev. Mar. 30, 2009).
200. Id.
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of address and inquiring about the status of her claim through tele-
phone calls and letters,” the court allowed her claim.201
In the course of the debate over the Ledbetter Act, one Senator
noted an example in which Congress was faced with a similar prob-
lem: that of victims finding themselves unable to vindicate their rights
against identity theft without the help of a discovery rule.202 In TRW
Inc. v. Andrews,203 the Supreme Court interpreted the two-year statute
of limitations provision of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in
effect at that time.204 Under the FCRA, as it existed when the Court
considered Andrews, the statute indicated that an action to enforce
any liability created by the FCRA may be brought “within two years
from the date on which the liability arises.” 205 There was an exception
to this limitations period in cases where there had been a “willful mis-
representation of ‘any information required under [the Act] to be dis-
closed to [the plaintiff].’ ” 206 According to the Court, “[w]hen such a
representation is material to a claim under the Act, suit may be
brought ‘within two years after [the plaintiff’s] discovery . . . of the
misrepresentation.’ ” 207 The case did not involve any allegations of
misrepresentation of information, but the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals nevertheless applied the discovery rule exception to the lim-
itations period, holding that the limitations period commenced to run
on the plaintiff’s claim only upon her discovery of the defendant’s
alleged violations of the Act.208
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, noting
that § 1681p “explicitly delineates the exceptional case in which dis-
covery triggers the two-year limitation.” 209 Because the facts did not
suggest that “exceptional case,” the Court decided it was “not at lib-
erty to make Congress’ explicit exception the general rule as well.” 210
Recognizing that “this [decision] could unduly penalize victims of iden-
201. Id.
202. 155 CONG. REC. S673, 695-96 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. Voinovich).
Sen. Voinovich incorrectly referred to the lawsuit as “TRW v. Adelaide” when, in fact,
the suit is captioned “TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001).”
203. 534 U.S. 19 (2001).
204. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (1994) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2006)); see also
Andrews, 534 U.S. at 22 n.1 (noting that Congress had changed the FCRA since the time
that plaintiff filed suit in October, 1996, but that Congress had not changed the sections
relevant to the instant case).
205. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (1994) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2006)).
206. Andrews, 534 U.S. at 22 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (1994) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1681p (2006))).
207. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (1994) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2006))).
208. Andrews v. TRW, Inc. (Andrews I), 225 F.3d 1063, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d,
534 U.S. 19 (2001).
209. Andrews, 534 U.S. at 22-23.
210. Id. at 23.
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tity theft,” 211 Congress changed the law.212 Extending the discovery
rule to apply to all impermissible conduct, the FCRA now provides
that “[a]n action to enforce any liability created under this subchapter
may be brought . . . [two] years after the date of discovery by the plain-
tiff of the violation that is the basis for such liability.” 213 Congress
guarded against the possibility of “open-ended legal liability” that
might otherwise sound the death knell for discovery rules of this
sort,214 by requiring a plaintiff to bring a claim “not later than . . . [five]
years after the date on which the violation that is the basis for such
liability occurs.” 215
The FCRA’s incorporation of the discovery rule as the “general
rule,” together with its five year limit for bringing a claim without re-
gard to discovery by a plaintiff, responds to the realities of identity
theft and the difficulties of its discovery, while at the same time avoid-
ing the threat of endless exposure to liability.216 This offers a model
for what Congress could have done with the Ledbetter Act, and what
the courts are still free to do given the absence of any directive in the
Act with regard to the discovery rule.217
CONCLUSION
In light of Congress’s silence on the issue in its recent amendment
to Title VII and the need to protect individuals against pay discrimi-
nation that is hard to discover, the time has come to incorporate the
discovery rule into Title VII pay discrimination claims. As empha-
sized by the courts that have already done so, the incorporation of the
rule will effectuate the purposes of Title VII without compromising
the protections afforded by the statute’s limitations period.
211. 155 CONG. REC. S673, 696 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. Voinovich).
212. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p(1) (2006) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2000)).
213. Id.
214. 155 CONG. REC. S673, 696 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2009) (statement of Sen. Voinovich).
215. 15 U.S.C. § 1681p(2) (2006).
216. Id.
217. See Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting the
application of the discovery rule in federal question cases absent “a contrary directive
from Congress”).
